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Electronic Voting, Turnout, and Voter Self-Selection: Evidence 
from a Quasi-Natural Experiment  
 
We take advantage of a quasi-natural experiment in Évora, Portugal, to evaluate the impact of 
electronic voting on the 2019 European election results. We rely on difference-in-differences 
estimations, with control groups chosen by matching methods, and find that the turnout rate 
decreases by 2 percentage points, a decline mostly explained by the decrease of the 
Communist Party’s vote share. Socio-economic characteristics of these voters, including 
higher age, and lower education and income levels, may explain the results. We performed an 
on-site and online questionnaire, and find that those participating, mostly highly educated, 
were for the most part aware of and shared a positive view of the electronic voting procedure, 
described as ‘easy’ and ‘effective’. 
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Modern democracies face the challenge of low electoral participation (Wattenberg 2002; 
Blais and Rubenson 2013). If elections exist to establish a parliament that represents the 
people, lower turnout rates may lead to biased and unequal political influence, when 
compared to the full electorate (Lijphart 1997). To tackle this issue, policy makers have 
attempted several approaches, one being electronic voting. There are two types of electronic 
voting: internet voting and presential voting. In the first method, in place in countries such as 
Estonia (Alvarez, Hall and Trechsel 2009), citizens vote remotely, using a computer and 
internet. In the second method, in current use in the United States and Brazil (Avgerou et al. 
2009; Dee 2007; Card and Moretti 2007), citizens still have to go to the polling station, but 
they vote through an electronic voting machine (EVM). One of the advantages of presential 
electronic voting is a shorter time to know the electoral results and, when combined with the 
possibility of voting in any polling station, a lower cost for the citizens who are away from 
their place of registration, which may encourage turnout.  
In this paper, we take advantage of a quasi-experiment that took place in Évora, Portugal, 
on the 2019 European election, and conduct a differences-in-differences estimation to assess 
the impact of optional electronic voting on turnout rate. With the expectation of an increase 
on representation of far-right parties, typically with contrary values to the European Union, 
and its closeness to the national elections, the 2019 European election was of a higher 
importance. Traditionally with low electoral participation, there was an urgent call for ideas in 
order to boost turnout, such as electronic voting. However, in the particular case of the 
experiment, citizens still had to go the polling station, meaning there was no significant 
decrease on the cost of voting. When we compare Évora with two contiguous districts of the 
same region, Portalegre and Beja, we do not find evidence of any change in turnout rates. 
However, when using matching methods to have a similar control group with the treated 
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district, we find evidence that turnout rates decreased, on average, by about 2 percentage 
points in our treated district, ceteris paribus. A question of great interest, given the nature of 
electronic voting and the similar cost for voters, is assessing whether people vote differently 
across the two voting methods. We establish that CDU, dominated by the Portuguese 
Communist Party (PCP), sees their votes share consistently decrease by 2 percentage points, 
on average, when we compare Évora with the matched control group. PCP voters tend to be 
older, with a lower level of education and from lower socio-economic class, indicating 
electronic voting could have scared this population group, as suggested in existing literature.  
To further explore the results, we conducted an online and on-site survey in Évora, 
gathering 316 valid answers. 89% of voters were aware of the electronic voting option, in a 
sample of highly educated people. Moreover, it was found that when narrowing the sample to 
the citizens who used electronic voting and gave a positive feedback, the percentage of people 
with higher education increases. Similarly, there are less retired and old people and 
consequently more youngers. Both results are consistent with the decrease of CDU’s vote 
share and its voters’ profile. Additionally, electronic voting was perceived as ‘easy’, effective’ 
and ‘simple’. In fact, when asked whether they found electronic voting difficult, 98% felt it 
was easy. 
2. Literature Review 
Turnout is decreasing in most elections in developed democracies (Wattenberg 2002; 
Blais and Rubenson 2013). Indeed, several studies have been done to understand the rationale 
behind voting behaviour and the sources of the negative trend of turnout (Blais and Rubenson 
2013). In Canada, Blais et al. (2004) concluded that propensity to vote decreased in all age 
groups, because not only were youngers not interested in politics, but also because they do not 
see voting as a moral obligation. Furthermore, both socioeconomic characteristics of parents 
and political resources determine whether new eligible youngers become habitual voters or 
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not, at least at the beginning (Plutzer 2002). These two factors together might explain the 
negative trend of turnout, considering its dynamics. Focusing on European elections, Reif and 
Schmitt (1980) strike that these elections are of ‘second-order’, implying a lower importance 
compared to the national elections, which could explain the lower turnout rates.  
In an attempt to reverse the negative trend, policymakers are trying new measures, 
although some with not the desired results: by way of example, Germann and Serdült (2017)  
studied the impact of internet voting introduced in two Swiss municipalities, Geneva and 
Zurich, and found out that there was a negative effect on electoral participation, although not 
statistically significant.  Contrarily, positive innovations include Election Day vote centres in 
the USA (Stein and Vonnahme 2008). In Australia, a country with turnout rate around 90%, 
there is compulsory voting, with a fine if citizens do not vote (Malkopoulou 2009). 
Focusing on electronic voting, Allers and Kooreman (2009) suggest that the share of 
residual voters1 is reduced as direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines are used, as 
it only becomes recorded the intentionally blank votes. Not surprisingly, turnout temporarily 
increases. After the first election with the new voting system, the effect becomes statistically 
insignificant. When using voting technologies some cautions must be made. Card and Moretti 
(2007) analysed how voting innovations could have influenced election outcomes in the 2000 
and 2004 US Presidential elections. They concluded that DRE voting was positively 
correlated with an increase of the vote share for the Republican Party. Interestingly, the 
authors also found out that DRE voting can impact election results through turnout: they 
found out that Hispanics, who tend to vote more for the Democratic party, presented lower 
levels of turnout, although no effect on Blacks. Along with this hypothesis, it was shown that 
elderlies are also expected to use their voting rights less often with the change in voting 
technology (Roseman and Stephenson 2005). At the same time, no significant results were 
                                                             
1 Votes that are cast, but not attributed to a particular candidate, such as null and blank votes. 
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found for the low-educated citizens. Using the 2003 California gubernatorial recall election, 
Dee (2007) presented evidence that when using punch-card systems California citizens saw 
their votes mistakenly taken, as they tend to confuse and vote erroneously for one of the four 
candidates positioned above or below the two main candidates.  
3. Institutional Background 
In 1986, after several enlargements, Portugal and Spain became the 11th and 12th 
countries of the now called European Union. Among several treaties signed, highlights to the 
Lisbon Treaty, which came in force on December 1, 2009, since it implemented several 
changes regarding the powers of the European Parliament (EP), as a way to increase citizens’ 
voice inside the EU. First, 40 new policy areas were given to EP, from agriculture and 
fisheries to security and justice. At the same time, the institution would now have similar 
powers to the Council, concerning the approval of the annual budget and it would elect the 
President of the Commission, the executive body of the EU. 
To better economically integrate the several and diverse countries of the EU, there is a 
system of contributions and consequently redistribution of the funds. In 2017, total EU 
spending in Portugal was roughly 4.000 billion euros (€ 3.976 billion, 2.11% of Portuguese 
Gross National Income in 2017), while Portuguese contribution to the EU budget was around 
1.300 billion euros (€ 1.375 billion, 0.73% of GNI), meaning that Portugal was a net receiver. 
Indeed, the increase of the EU funds impacts positively the entry rates of firms, especially of 
micro firms, improving and boosting economic growth (Santos and Tavares 2018). 
Before analysing Portuguese voting behaviours on European elections, it is important to 
understand their feelings towards the EU. According to a Flash Eurobarometer presented in 
May 2019, 81% of the interviewers agreed that ‘what brings European citizens together is 
more important than what separates them’, meaning that the Portuguese understand the 
importance of European values and their advantages. Moreover, referring to the Spring 2019 
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Eurobarometer of the EP, when asked whether they would vote to leave the EU, 77% of the 
Portuguese interviewers would vote ‘remain’. Indeed, 69% said they looked at the EU as 
‘good thing’. Not surprisingly, 82% considers that Portugal benefited from joining the EU, 
contrasting with the EU-average of just 68%. EP is the only EU institution directly elected by 
citizens. However, the majority of the Portuguese does not feel heard in the EU (51%), and 
when asked when the European elections were going to take place, 29% did not know and 
38% did not answer correctly, with 47% of the interviewers admitting that it was improbable 
that they would vote. Lastly, when asked for the reasons for not voting, independently of 
voting or not, highlights to powerless vote (33%) and distrust on the political system (30%). 
As stated before, EU countries directly elects members of the EP on European Elections. 
From the elections Portugal has participated in, there were held eight ones with the last one 
being on 26 May 2019. Concerning all EU countries, in this last election, overall turnout 
increased for the first time ever, after its negative trend since 1979, year of the first elections, 
reaching more than 50%. According to Eurobarometer, the most contributor to the increase 
was the young generation. Interestingly, compared with 2014, more people voted due to civic 
duty (52%, + 11pp in 2014) and more support of the European Union (25%, +11pp).  
a.  The Experiment 
In an attempt to reinforce democratic participation, on July 18, 2018, the parliament 
passed a law to promote ‘the implementation, on an experimental basis, of in-situ electronic 
voting, in at least 10 municipalities’. The project was developed by Secretaria Geral do 
Ministério da Admnistração Interna (SGMAI). The chosen district was Évora, because, 
according to the report written by SGMAI: it had 14 municipalities (close to 10); it had 
proportional distribution between rural and urban municipalities and civil parishes; it had a 
significant number of voters and a good representativity among municipalities; any civil 
parish was less than 60 minutes’ drive to the county seat; and last but not least, it had the 
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support of the Intermunicipal Community of Alentejo Central (Comunidade Intermunicipal 
do Alentejo Central). 
Évora is one of Portugal’s 18 districts and belongs to Alentejo region, coinciding with the 
Intermunicipal Community of Alentejo Central (sub-region). It is in the South of Portugal and 
it is composed of 14 municipalities and 69 civil parishes. In 2018, Alentejo Central had 
around 153,701 inhabitants in its 7,393 km2, being the sixth sub-region with a lower 
population density (20.8). In parallel, taking into account only Continental Portugal 
(mainland), Alentejo Central ranks top 3 with the fewest concluded constructions for housing 
(121 in 2018), with Alto Alentejo and Baixo Alentejo being placed number 1 and 2, 
respectively. The lack of railways investment on services and infrastructure does not help to 
modernize the region, with good potential considering its closeness to Portugal’s capital, 
Lisbon, and Spain. Évora’s GDP per capita in 2017 was 16.732, below the national average 
(18.894). Using Census data, we conclude that employed people in the primary sector has 
declined from 61.2% in 1960 to 9.3% in 2011, while the tertiary sector saw an increase from 
22.3% to 69.4%. 
Alentejo Central, as other sub-regions of Alentejo, is traditionally left-wing, currently 
with 11 (out of 14) municipalities with mayors from Socialist Party (PS – Partido Socialista) 
and Unitary Democratic Coalition2 (CDU - Coligação Democrática Unitária), and the other 
three (Borba, Estremoz and Redondo) with independent mayors. Only Mourão and Vila 
Viçosa have had right-wing mayors from the main centre-right party, PPD/PSD (Socialist 
Democratic Party). However, in the XXI century, the winners were always PS or PCP (or 
independent mayors) in local elections. Indeed, the Communist Party always had a strong 
support in Alentejo since its clandestine existence. During Estado Novo (1926-1974), the 
authoritarian regime, Alentejo’s labour force was mostly composed by salaried farm workers, 
                                                             
2 CDU is a coalition dominated by the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP – Partido Comunista Português), 
hence we will refer to PCP henceforth. It also includes the Ecologist Party “The Green” (PEV – Partido 
Ecologista “Os Verdes”).  
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in precarious conditions who saw support on PCP, which explains why the party is strong in 
the region (Maxwell 1997). Concerning national elections, in 2015 for the first time ever and 
after the economic and financial crisis, the two main radical left parties, PCP and Left Bloc 
(BE – Bloco de Esquerda), supported parliamentary the minority government of PS 
(Fernandes 2016; Lisi 2016). By surprise of many, since the radical parties were always seen 
as the ‘voice of protest and opposition outside the parliament’ (Fernandes, Magalhães and 
Santana-Pereira 2018), the government lasted for the entire legislature. Focusing on European 
elections, after two consecutive elections with high electoral participation (in 1987, on the 
same day as the legislative election, and 1989) turnout rate has been stable, with values 
between 30% and 40% nationally since 2004. After the economic crisis and the bailout with 
the intervention of Troika between 2011 and 2014, which harmed European Elections on 
2014 (Freire and Santana-Pereira 2015), overall turnout increased in 2019. Nevertheless, as 
displayed in figure 1, there is a strong trend towards a decrease in turnout rate both in Évora 
and in its neighbouring districts. As one might expect, PS and PCP have cast the majority of 
the votes across this district (37.85% and 21.55%, respectively3). 
Figure 1 Turnout Rate on European Elections
 
Coming back to the electronic voting experiment, in all 14 municipalities, there were a 
total of 185 traditional polling stations in all civil parishes and 47 electronic polling stations 
distributed among 25 civil parishes. Hence, there were polling places with only traditional 
                                                             
3 The denominator considered is voters. 
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polling stations and others with both systems. All municipalities had at least one direct-
recording electronic voting machine, which was working independently of the traditional 
polling stations. Thus, the two methods co-existed across the district, ‘allowing the citizens to 
choose between using a traditional method or an electronic one’ (Voto Eletrónico no Distrito 
de Évora – Relatório Final, page 8). It was chosen to establish a non-binding electronic 
voting system because it was a pilot experiment. Since not all civil parishes had electronic 
machines, Évora’s voters could vote electronically in any polling station, regardless of their 
residence. This was made possible by the dematerialization of the electoral roll, meaning that 
instead of a paper electoral roll there were portable computers with the information needed. 
During the Election Day, the procedure went as follows: the system of the electronic 
machine was started, with the introduction of a smartcard and a PIN of the president or vice-
president of the polling station to activate the citizen’s session. The ballot would appear, and 
the voter would press the chosen option.4 After voting, the paper ballot would be printed for 
the voter to verify the vote (voter-verifiable paper audit trail). Afterwards, the voter would 
fold the paper in four and deliver it to the responsible person to put it on the ballot box. 
For the experiment, SGMAI was authorized to bear the costs, arising from: 
a) the purchase of 430 telecommunication equipment up to a maximum of 349,900 €, 
plus VAT; 
b) the purchase of portable computers for the dematerialization of electoral roll (CED) up 
to a maximum of 235,000€, plus VAT; 
c) the contract for the provision of services for the development of a software for the 
dematerialized electoral roll (CED), in a total amount of 408,666€, plus VAT.  
Thus, a total of 1,22 million €, including VAT, was available for the experiment to run.  
                                                             
4 Including an option for blank and null vote. 
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In reality, there were two contracts concluded, taking into account two categories (lotes): 
Electronic Voting System and associated services (category 1) and Infrastructure provision 
and communications services between polling stations and National Internal Security 
Network (RNSI – Rede Nacional de Segurança Interna), as well as the equipment installation 
and support (category 2), which included the 430 telecommunication equipment. Category 1 
costed a maximum value of 598,279.37€, plus VAT, while Category 2 costed 348,876.20€, 
plus VAT, giving a total of around 1,17 million €, including VAT. 
Some interesting results can be advanced using simple arithmetic computations. Out of 
the 232 polling stations, 47 were electronic (20.26% out of total), while the remaining 185 
were traditional (79.74%). Moreover, 15,735 Évora’s citizens chose to vote electronically, 
representing 33.29% of total voters. Thus, electronic voting machines seemed to have a 
positive effect on voters’ choice, since the proportion of people who voted on DRE machines 
was higher than the proportion of electronic voting stations. In fact, in Mourão, more than half 
of voters opted to use DRE machines, although the difference was only 16 voters. In Évora, 
the district’s capital, 37.08% of the voters chose to vote electronically. 
4. Empirical strategy 
a.  Empirical methodology 
We take advantage of a quasi-experiment in Évora’s district, with the introduction of the 
electronic voting option to evaluate its impact on turnout and on the percentage of votes on 
certain parties. For this, we will use differences-in-differences (DiD, henceforth) and 
matching procedures. 
To estimate the effect of the electronic voting option on the different political outcomes 
(turnout rate, percentage of blank, null and parties’ votes), we estimate the following 




𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜂1 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑦 are the different outcome variables defined in the following section, 𝛼𝑖  are the 
municipality fixed effects, 𝜆𝑡 the year fixed effects, 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑  is a binary variable which takes 
value one if the municipality belongs to Évora’s district, i.e., had the option of electronic 
voting and zero otherwise, 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  is a binary indicator that takes value one for 2019, 
the year of the implementation of the policy, and 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛽 is a vector of socio–demographic, 
economic, and political characteristics at the municipal level, which will be further described 
in the section below. Following Bertrand, Duflo and Mullain (2004), we cluster standard 
errors at the municipal level. 
One of the most crucial assumptions to correctly implement DiD is the common trends or 
parallel trends assumption. It states that, in the absence of treatment, the unobserved 
differences between the treated and control groups would be constant over time. To test it, we 
will run the following regression and show the graphic design to be easily assessed. If this 
assumption does not hold, DiD estimates are biased and we cannot rely on the results. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜏2 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 + ∑ 𝜂𝑡 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
2019
𝑡=2004 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
The first control group we use is Portalegre and Beja’s districts, because they belong to 
the same region – Alentejo. However, in order to get a more homogeneous comparison group, 
controlling for the observed characteristics, we use matching, and more precisely 2-nearest 
neighbour, to choose another control group (Rubin 1979; Stuart et al. 2014). For robustness, 
we also show DiD results comparing Évora with a comparison group obtained with a kernel 
matching procedure. 
Thus, the first matching method was nearest neighbour. Here, for each treated unit 𝑖, the 
software finds a comparison group by 𝐴𝑗(𝑥) = {𝑗|𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑗||𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗||}, where || || is the 
Euclidian distance between vectors. Simplifying, we are matching each treated unit with the 
closest untreated observation (in our paper, we use 2-nearest neighbour, meaning we try to 
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find two untreated units for each treated). Afterwards, we also weight using kernel, which 






     (3) 
The geographical distribution of two out of three control groups is displayed in figure 2. 
Figure 2 Geographical distribution of the treated and control municipalities  
Control group: Portalegre and Beja 
 
Control group: 2-nearest neighbour 
 
 
Furthermore, to verify that the three control groups were similar to the treated units, we 
perform balanced tests to analyse their differences on observables.  
b.  Data 
The dataset used covers all municipalities of Portugal mainland, from 2004 to 2019. 
Besides electoral results, there is no data available for 2019, so we use data from 2018 for the 
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non-political variables. The only exception is energy consumed, for which we use data from 
2017, due to unavailability. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used. 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for period 2004-2019 
  Sample I  Sample II 
 
Évora, Portalegre and Beja 
 Évora and Matching: 2-nearest 
neighbour 
 




   Turnout rate 172 0.369838 0.054321  152 0.354879 0.048682 
Percentage of PS voters 172 0.141546 0.037549  152 0.12852 0.034698 
Percentage of PCP 
voters 172 0.095756 0.055736 
 
152 0.074338 0.053582 
Percentage of 
PSD/CDS voters 172 0.06669 0.028326 
 
152 0.08039 0.040334 
Percentage of voters on 
other parties 172 0.047469 0.014807 
 
152 0.051412 0.02029 
Percentage of Blank 
votes 172 0.011344 0.004113 
 
152 0.012773 0.005206 
Percentage of Null 
votes 172 0.007032 0.002345 
 




   Dummy if town hall is 
left 172 0.802326 0.399408 
 
152 0.835526 0.37193 
Dummy if town hall is 
neither left nor right 172 0.05814 0.23469 
 
152 0.085526 0.280588 
Dummy if town hall 
aligned with 
government 172 0.319767 0.467748 
 
152 0.335526 0.473735 
Share of population 
with 14 y.o. or less 172 0.830076 1.81856 
 
152 0.722043 1.746136 
Share of population 
with 65 y.o or more 172 0.270826 0.042761 
 
152 0.247844 0.040078 
Energy consumption 
per capita 172 4.50849 4.788545 
 
152 3.901146 1.351215 
Share of 
unemployment 172 0.073999 0.105116 
 
152 0.063852 0.114687 
Municipal expenditures 
per capita 172 1.702737 0.656205 
 
152 1.402203 0.639239 
 
We wanted to assess the impact of electronic voting on different political outcomes 
(turnout rate, percentage of blank, null and parties’ votes). Our main dependent variable – 
turnout – was computed as the number of people who voted (voters) divided by the number of 
people who could vote, independently of having voted or not (eligible voters). Turnout is 
calculated to analyse whether electronic voting improved electoral participation or not. 
Afterward, we also calculate the percentage of the votes in certain parties (mainly PS and 
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PCP, the two main parties of the region) out of the total eligible voters. With the results, we 
can see if, despite the results for turnout, voters voted differently when using electronic 
voting. Data directly related to voting was taken from SGMAI. 
Since Alentejo region has a certain preference for left parties, as we described above, we 
control it by using three political dummy variables. The first is equal to one if the winning 
party of the town hall is from left and zero otherwise; the second is equal to one if the 
winning party of the town hall is neither right nor left, and zero otherwise; the last political 
dummy variable is one if the president of the town hall is aligned with the central 
government, and zero otherwise. Due to unavailable data, we narrowed our choice for the 
demographic and economic control variables. As demographic variables, we include both 
share of the population with less than 15 years old as well as share of the population with 
or more than 65 years old, taken from Instituto Nacional de Estatística. Goerres (2007) 
concluded that as older individuals are used to vote, their turnout rates are higher and thus we 
expect higher levels in those municipalities. Since there is no measure for GDP segregated by 
municipalities, we use energy consumption per capita, taken from Direção-Geral de 
Geologia e Energia. We expect richer municipalities to be more politically involved, with 
more social connections and thus a higher sense of society and a higher propensity to vote 
(Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001). Still, according to Stockemer (2015), there is a 
quadratic relationship between turnout and GDP, since a higher GDP is expected to increase 
the level of turnout, until a certain point when turnout starts decreasing. As Évora is still a 
rural region, with GDP below the national average, we expect that higher GDP (and thus 
higher energy consumption per capita) increases turnout. We know that a higher level of 
unemployment rate increases citizens’ concerns about the future and thus it can lead to a 
higher turnout rate, as a way to express their fears (Cebula 2017). Hence, we include the 
municipalities’ unemployment rate , using data from Gabinete de Estratégia e Estudos (until 
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2006) and Instituto de Emprego e Formação Profissional onwards. Lastly, we add 
municipalities’ expenditures per capita taken from Direção-Geral das Autarquias Locais, 
because, with their increase, citizens perceive elections as of higher importance and thus 
turnout is expected to increase (Percival et al. 2007). 
Our period of analysis starts in 2004 since it is when the different outcomes remain 
relatively stable over time. In the first European elections, 1987 and 1989, the rates of turnout 
were above the current ones. Moreover, Eurozone was established in 1999, with the adoption 
of the Euro, which could have influenced the 1999 European election results. 
Before analysing the treatment effect of the policy, it is first important to understand if 
the different control groups are comparable to the treated group, so we performed the balance 
tests, which are shown on table 2.  
Table 2 Mean differences between Treatment and Control, 2014 
  
Portalegre and Beja 




Dummy if town hall is left 
0.027  -0.131  -0.185 
(0.139)  (0.127)  (0.113) 
Dummy if town hall is 
neither left nor right 
0.180  0.131  0.185 
(0.118)  (0.127)  (0.113) 
Dummy if town hall 
aligned with government 
-0.207**  0.000  0.000 
(0.077)  -  - 
Share of population with 
14 y.o. or less 
0.366  0.589  0.781 
(0.896)  (0.890)  (0.854) 
Share of population with 
65 y.o or more 
-0.012  0.016  0.012 
(0.012)  (0.012)  (0.009) 
Energy consumption per 
capita 
-1.447  -0.066  0.381 
(1.334)  (0.279)  (0.246) 
Share of unemployment 
0.002  0.004  0.002 
(0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Municipalities’ 
expenditures per capita 
-0.405***  0.058  0.143 
(0.135)  (0.146)  (0.110) 
Number of observations 43  38  83 
Number of treated 14  14  14 
Number of control 29  24  69 
 
Although Portalegre and Beja belong to the same region as Évora – Alentejo - we see that 
these two districts are statistically different regarding the party that is in the town hall and the 
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government, and in the municipalities’ expenditures per capita. However, when using 
matching, we have statistically better control groups, apparently similar in the variables we 
can observe. Thus, we can use DiD to calculate the impact of the electronic voting option. 
In our analysis, to be demanding, we focus our attention more on the control group using 
2-nearest neighbour, since it appears to have lower differences on the observables. 
5. Results 
a.  Baseline results 
The first outcome of interest is turnout, as one of the main goals of modernizing elections 
is to boost electoral participation. The results are presented in table 3. 
For each dependent variable, the first three columns are the results using Portalegre and 
Beja as a control group, column (4) using the control group computed using 2-nearest 
neighbour and column (5) kernel. Column (1) presents the simplest diff-in-diff model, with no 
controls. We then included municipal fixed effects in column (2). Finally, columns (3), (4) 
and (5) have all control variables described in the data section.  
Table 3 Baseline Results - Turnout 
 






















































Municipalities  43 43 38 83 





Outcome’s mean of 
treated group in 2014 0.3780 0.3780 0.3780  0.3780  0.3780 
Note: Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. The set of time-varying municipal controls 
includes dummy if the mayor elected is from a left party, dummy if the mayor elected is neither from left nor right party, dummy if the mayor elected is 
aligned with government, share of population with 14 y.o. or less, share of population with 65 y.o. or more, energy consumption per capita, share of 




Turnout tended to decrease with the treatment. However, only when the control groups 
were more similar – groups created by matching – do we have statistically significant results. 
Using 2-nearest neighbour, we conclude that turnout decreased by 1.91 percentage points, 
with the option of electronic voting, on average ceteris paribus, being statistically significant 
at 99% confidence level. 
Nonetheless, we were not expecting negative changes on turnout, since electronic voting 
was merely an option, allowing citizens to choose. However, this policy has certain 
particularities: citizens still have to go to the polling station to vote and, as the experiment 
only took place in Évora, there was no decrease on the time to know the electoral results. 
These two facts combined might explain why turnout rate did not increase: costs of voting 
were practically the same. So, it is interesting to know if there was a general decrease on 
voters among all parties or if some parties suffered more, to see if there are certain voters’ 
characteristics which might explain the aversion to technology. From background section, we 
know that the main political parties of Évora’s district are PS and PCP, so we first analysed 
these two outcomes. Results are shown on tables 4 and 5, respectively. 
Table 4 Baseline Results - PS votes (%) 
 























Treated*2019 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0007  -0.0036  0.0005 
 
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0037)  (0.0048)  (0.0043) 




















Municipalities  43 43  38  83 
Adjusted R-squared 0.533 0.837 0.853  0.821  0.781 
Outcome’s mean of 
treated group in 2014 0.1321 0.1321 0.1321  0.1321  0.1321 
Note: Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. The set of time-varying municipal controls 
includes dummy if the mayor elected is from a left party, dummy if the mayor elected is neither from left nor right party, dummy if the mayor elected is 
aligned with government, share of population with 14 y.o. or less, share of population with 65 y.o. or more, energy consumption per capita, share of 




Regarding PS votes, the most voted party in the region, we see no statistically significant 
difference among control and treatment groups. 
Table 5 Baseline Results – Communist Party votes (%) 
 























Treated*2019 -0.0098 -0.0098 0.0092  -0.0200***  -0.0256*** 
 
(0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0058)  (0.0066)  (0.0055) 




















Municipalities  43 43 38 83 
Adjusted R-squared 0.187 0.748 0.760  0.692  0.641 
Outcome’s mean of 
treated group in 2014 0.1232 0.1232 0.1232  0.1232  0.1232 
Note: Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. The set of time-varying municipal controls 
includes dummy if the mayor elected is from a left party, dummy if the mayor elected is neither from left nor right party, dummy if the mayor elected is 
aligned with government, share of population with 14 y.o. or less, share of population with 65 y.o. or more, energy consumption per capita, share of 
unemployment, municipalities’  expenditures per capita. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). 
 
However, the results for PCP are similar to the ones presented on turnout. No statistically 
significant differences comparing Évora to Portalegre and Beja. Despite so, the percentage of 
PCP votes decreased 2 percentage points on average ceteris paribus, using 2-nearest 
neighbour. Interestingly, the magnitude of the coefficient is similar to the one expected by 
turnout. Alentejo is an important region for PCP since its existence during the authoritarian 
regime, as salaried farm workers in precarious conditions saw support in the party (Maxwell 
1997). Several authors have acknowledged that the party is also close to the trade union 
movement (Watson 2015; Freire 2009). Moreover, PCP voters tend to be less religious and 
from lower socioeconomic classes, with only a minority being from upper class (Freire 2009). 
Furthermore, PCP casts most of its votes among aged people, with only primary education. 
Usually voters are employees, not including self-employed, and retired people (Cabral 1995). 
On the 2019 European Election, according to a poll made by Centro de Estudos e Sondagens 
de Opinião of Catholic University, PCP casted the majority of its votes among the people 
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with more than 65 years old (Público 2019). Being from a lower economic class and older, 
PCP voters could have an aversion to technology, and not trusting it. In addition, they could 
be uninformed, not knowing it was merely an option.  
In the appendix, we show the results computed for the percentage of votes in other 
parties, nulls and blanks. We can only observe statistically significant results when comparing 
Évora with Portalegre and Beja, contrarily to turnout rate and PCP votes. Despite so, the 
percentage of blank votes, a measure of political protest (Driscoll and Nelson 2014) increased 
with the electronic voting option. We will further develop the topic. On appendix, we also 
show the results when we performed DiD using the logarithm form of voters, controlling for 
the logarithm form of eligible voters. The results are similar to the ones computed for turnout 
rate, in terms of significance. Moreover, we develop our analyses by excluding the districts’ 
capitals (Évora, Beja and Portalegre) to treatment and the first control groups (Portalegre and 
Beja districts) for turnout rate and percentage of votes on PS and PCP. There are no 
statistically significant results. 
Lastly, we also analysed, using simple arithmetic computations, the results of Évora on 
an electronic versus traditional voting approach. Out of the total number of people who voted 
using the electronic method, 31% voted on PS, while the percentage of PS voters among the 
traditional approach was 37%. Similarly, only 16% of electronic voters opt to choose PCP, 
contrasting with 22% of the traditional voters. This means that both PS and PCP cast more 
votes among the traditional voters, which is in line with the results we got from DiD. 
Contrarily, other parties’ and blank voters saw a higher proportion of their voters using 
electronic voting machines.  
b.  Internal Validity Considerations  
As explained previously in the methodology section, DiD relies on the parallel trends 
assumption. Therefore, we analyse the different outcomes variables through time, starting in 
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2004, which are presented in figure 3. We show only the results for one matched control 
group, since we observe less differences between the control and treated groups using 2-
nearest neighbour. 




Notes: 95% Confidence Levels. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. 
Regarding turnout, we conclude that, using 95% confidence interval, there are no 
statistically significant differences between the two groups, until the year of the treatment. 
Moreover, we could already predict that turnout tended to decrease with the introduction of 
the electronic voting option. Concerning the other two dependent variables, we see no 
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difference between control and treated group before the intervention. Despite so, we notice 
that there is a statistically significant negative jump on the percentage of voters of PCP in 
2019 and no jump concerning PS. 
c.  Survey 
Between July and September 2019, we also performed on-site5 and online surveys (51% 
vs 49%, respectively) to understand the citizens’ thoughts about the electronic voting, as well 
as demographic characteristics of Évora’s voters. The translated questionnaire is displayed on 
appendix 4, while the graphical analyses are presented on appendix 5. 
 We took a sample of 469 answers, 316 of which valid. The sample is balanced in terms 
of gender (50% males), with a higher proportion of citizens with higher education (53%), 
which might be biased. Despite so, 89% of the people knew about the electronic voting 
option. In this subsample, and conditional of having voted electronically (153 answers), 63% 
of the citizens had higher education, a bigger value than our original sample. If we narrow 
down to the people who gave a positive feedback (124 answers), then the proportion of highly 
educated people increases even more to 66%. Thus, more educated people tended to vote 
electronically and had a positive feedback about the system. This means that lower educated 
people, who are an important part of PCP sympathisers, were not users of the electronic 
method option, which might explain the decrease on PCP’s vote share. Furthermore, 
assuming more educated people are the ones who tend to express a voter of protest, then the 
significant increase of blanks votes might be explained by the increase of the proportion of 
educated people. The fact is also confirmed by the poll made by Centro de Estudos e 
Sondagens de Opinião of Catholic University , which shows that the majority of blank votes 
was casted among the most-educated people (Público 2019). 
                                                             
5 We surveyed citizens in Borba, Estremoz, Évora and Vila Viçosa. 
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Similarly, the original sample has 16% of retired people, but, as we narrow the sample, 
its percentage decreases, reinforcing the conclusions for the PCP’s results. More specifically, 
when using the answers of people who knew about the electronic voting and used it, the 
percentage of retired people decreases to 11%. A decrease in the proportion of retired people, 
from which PCP casts its votes, suggests a decrease on the party’s share of votes.  The same 
goes for old people: when narrowing the sample, the proportion of young people increases 
and old people decreases, helping the narrative. 
It is also interesting to note that, considering the original sample, only 48% knew about 
the possibility of voting electronically in a civil parish which was not the citizen’s civil parish 
of residence. Considering that the sample is slightly biased towards educated people, who are 
the ones who tend to be more informed about electoral news and modernisations, there was an 
important misinformation about the process and a misuse of an important advantage that 
could boost turnout. 
As mentioned before, the last question of the survey was “Describe the voting experience 
in one word”. Word map is displayed on appendix 6. Although the question was biased 
towards the voting action and not the electronic voting, some people understood the intention 
of the question to relate to electronic voting. We observe that most answers were positive. 
Examples include “good”, “simple”, “innovative” and “effective”, which are related to 
electronic voting. However, “useless” and “distrust” were also recurrent answers, which can 
be seen a distrust of electronic voting or of political system and thus explain the decrease on 
turnout. 
6. Conclusions 
However puzzling the balance of benefits and costs that makes people vote (Dhillon and 
Peralta 2002), mature democracies tend to experience a steady decrease in voter turnout. 
Electronic voting is emerging as a possible way to decrease the costs of voting, namely by 
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simplifying procedures and adding the possibility of voting away from the place of 
registration. In addition to logistic and ecological advantages, electronic voting furthers 
expediency and transparency in vote counting. In the 2019 European Election, an election 
traditionally associated with low turnout, citizens of Évora’s district, in Portugal, were given 
the option of casting an electronic vote over a traditional voting procedure, to be decided at 
the polling station. We use this quasi-natural experiment to run a differences-in-differences 
estimation to assess the impact of electronic voting on electoral results. Our results show the 
availability of electronic voting is associated with a decrease in turnout of 2 percentage 
points. Our results may be explained by the fact that the cost of voting did not change 
significantly in our setting, as individuals had to be present at a polling station. We also find a 
significant decrease in the percentage of votes for the Portuguese Communist Party, of a 
magnitude similar to that of the decrease in turnout. When compared to the electorate at large, 
Communist voters are older, less educated citizens, with lower income, and thus possibly 
more averse to the use of technology. In the context of the existing literature, our results 
strongly suggest the use of innovative voting technology can exclude specific and groups of 
citizens, and thus matter for the final result.  
We recommend greater efforts be made to inform citizens of the nature and credibility of 
electronic voting mechanisms. One possible way to do so is for policy makers to motivate 
such symbiosis between technology and voting through the use of technological platforms to 
encourage turnout, such as the use of ATMs (Santos, Tavares and Vicente 2019). In sum, 
electronic voting is not a silver bullet solution for low turnout, especially in second-degree 
elections such as the European election. Furthermore, implementing electronic voting needs 
to go hand in hand with local knowledge as to the characteristics and distribution of the 
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Table A1 Baseline Results - Votes in other parties (%), null votes (%) and blank votes 
(%) 























    
 
    
 
    





































Adjusted R-squared 0.815 0.799   0.703 0.734   0.457 0.582 
Outcomes’ mean of 
treated group in 
2014 0.1023 0.1023  0.0122 0.0122  0.0080 0.0080 
Note: Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. The set of time-varying municipal controls includes 
dummy if the mayor elected is from a left party, dummy if the mayor elected is neither from left nor right party, dummy if the mayor elected is aligned with 
government, share of population with 14 y.o. or less, share of population with 65 y.o. or more, energy consumption per capita , share of unemployment, 
municipalities’ expenditures per capita. Other parties included all parties, except PS and PCP. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% 
(***). 
 
Table A2 Results for ln(voters) 
  
Portalegre and Beja 





(1)  (2)  (3) 
 
lnvoters  lnvoters  lnvoters 
 
        
Treated*2019 -0.0013  -0.0507**  -0.0384** 
 
(0.0173)  (0.0202)  (0.0186) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Municipal Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 172  152  332 
Municipalities 43  38  83 
Adjusted R-squared 0.912  0.849  0.768 
Note: Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. The set of time-varying municipal controls 
includes dummy if the mayor elected is from a left party, dummy if the mayor elected is neither from left nor right party , dummy if the mayor 
elected is aligned with government, share of population with 14 y.o. or less, share of population with 65 y.o. or more, energy cons umption per 
capita, share of unemployment, municipalities’ expenditures per capita. We also control for ln(eligible voters). Stars indicate significance levels 







Table A3 Results without districts' capitals  
  Portalegre and Beja 
 

















































Adjusted R-squared 0.689   0.851   0.760 
Note: Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. The 
set of time-varying municipal controls includes dummy if the mayor elected is from a left party, dummy if 
the mayor elected is neither from left nor right party , dummy if the mayor elected is aligned with 
government, share of population with 14 y.o. or less, share of population with 65 y.o. or more, energy 
consumption per capita, share of unemployment, municipalities’ expenditures per capita. Stars indicate 










Appendix 4 Translated survey 
 
As part of a master’s thesis from Nova SBE, I kindly ask to fill out this short questionnaire, 
to study the impact of electronic voting on the 2019 European Election. 
1. Gender: F ____ M ____   
2. Age: ____ 
3. Educational level  
Basic Education ____ Secondary Education____ Higher Education ____  Don’t 
know/No opinion ___ 
4. Professional occupation 
Student ___ Worker ____ Unemployed ____ Retired ___ Other ___ Don’t know/No 
opinion ___ 
5. How comfortable are you with technology? 
Very little 1 ___ 2 ___ 3 ___ 4 ___ Very 
6. In a scale from 1 to 4, how much interest in politics do you have? 
Very little 1 ___ 2 ___ 3 ___ 4 ___ Very 
7. In a scale from 1 to 4, how close do you feel towards the EU? 
Very little 1 ___ 2 ___ 3 ___ 4 ___ Very 
8. In a scale from 1 to 4, how to you evaluate EU’s policies? 
Negatively 1 ___ 2 ___ 3 ___ 4 ___ Positively 
9. Are you registered in Évora’s district, i.e., do you vote in Évora’s district?  
Yes ____ No ____ Don’t know/No opinion ____  
10.  Did you know about electronic voting in Évora’s district? 
Yes ____ No ____ Don’t know/No opinion ____  
11.  Did you have the possibility of electronically vote in your civil parish? 
Yes ____ No ____ Don’t know/No opinion ____  
12.  Did you know you could vote electronically in any parish, and not only in your civil 
parish of residence? 
Yes ____ No ____ Don’t know/No opinion ____  
13.  Did you vote on the 2014 European Election? 
Yes ____ No ____ Don’t know/No opinion ____  
14.  Did you vote on the 2019 European Election? 
Yes ____ No ____ Don’t know/No opinion ____  
15.  In case you voted, did you vote electronically? 
Yes ____ No ____ Don’t know/No opinion ____  
16.  In case you voted electronically, did you vote on your civil parish? 
Yes ____ No ____ Don’t know/No opinion ____  
17.  In case you voted electronically, did you find the process difficult? 
Yes ____ No ____ Don’t know/No opinion ____  






Appendix 5 Graphical analysis of the survey's answers  
 
Note: original sample includes all valid answers; sub-sample 1 includes all individuals who knew and voted electronically ; 
sub-sample 2 includes all individuals from sub-sample 1 that gave a positive feedback about the experience of voting . 
 
Note: original sample includes all valid answers; sub-sample 1 includes all individuals who knew and voted electronically ; 
sub-sample 2 includes all individuals from sub-sample 1 that gave a positive feedback about the experience of voting .
Note: original sample includes all valid answers; sub-sample 1 includes all individuals who knew and voted electronically ; 
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Note: original sample includes all valid answers; sub-sample 1 includes all individuals who knew and voted electronically ; 
sub-sample 2 includes all individuals from sub-sample 1 that gave a positive feedback about the experience of voting . 
 
Note: results for original sample only. 
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Note: results for original sample only. 
 
Note: results for the people who vote electronically on the 2019 European Election. 
Appendix 6 Word map of the answers to "Describe the voting experience in one word." 










Did you vote on the 2019 European election?
Traditionally Electronically Electronically, but not on civil parish of residence
1,94%
98,06%
In case you voted electronically, did you find the process 
difficult?
Yes No Don't know/No opinion
